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Abstract  
Economic models of Fiscal Federalism, according to different settings, are generally 
linear and static, offering unique and deterministic solutions starting with simplifying 
assumptions. This paper rises from the idea to investigate how the decision-makers, 
abandoning their traditional economic models and focusing, instead, the attention on 
innovative components of evolutionary economics, can achieve better performance 
results, to organize and to optimize an economic system based on Fiscal Federalism. For 
this purpose, Fiscal Federalism must be understood as a dense network of economic 
relationships between different complex adaptive and co-evolving systems, the 
jurisdictions, linked by strong interdependencies. A better understanding of the links 
between interdependence will be provided by the Kauffman’ NK-model. The relevance of 
the NK-model in the study of economic organizations has been detected several times in 
the literature. These studies, however, neglect the problem of co-evolution, which instead 
underpins this paper. 
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1.Introduction 
Federalism, both in theory and in reality, is a commonly used label to identify a wide 
range of political and institutional models characterized by the union of a functional and 
structural multiplicity of local authorities, variously named, but all have, more or less 
extensive powers of self government. Federalism, in this sense, means many things, 
among them often different and sometimes seemingly antithetical and, indeed, no model 
of Federalism, actually exists, equal to another. 
Also from the theoretical point of view there are significant differences in the approach to 
this issue. Buchanan (1960) for example, prefers a reading near to political philosophy 
and. Using the analogy between clubs and local government, he proposed to explain the 
behavior of local governments in order to determine the optimal level both of size and 
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activity; Musgrave (1959), however, considers Federalism primarily in terms of the 
theory of public finance, suggesting that the three are the functions assigned to the public 
sector: macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution and resource allocation. The 
first two have to be the exclusive prerogative of the central government, while the 
allocative efficiency of the decentralized governments. It follows an "easy" translation of 
these assumptions in the theory of an appropriate system of Fiscal Federalism, which is to 
maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences over public goods and services 
through the decentralization of public expenditure and revenue decisions. 
However, the pursuit of policies of public intervention, as any decision to maximize an 
objective function, in this case, the welfare of the community, through efficient public 
spending, cannot ignore the constraints of available resources. It would derive, otherwise, 
a set of distortions in the evaluation of policies that can affect in the long time the 
goodness of public intervention itself.  
In fact, it is not possible to consider optimal a choice that identifies the benefits of the 
intervention, but not the costs related to it and especially without taking into account the 
effects that the marked differences that characterize the reality of the individual 
territoriality, could have on the sustainability of federal structure in the active pursuit of 
fiscal policies. We must therefore make suitable choices for a complex and complicated 
reality and discard others that, although theoretically valid, result inconvenient when put 
in a heterogeneous environment.  
These observations do not seem to be taken into account by traditional economic 
modeling of Fiscal Federalism that aims to simplify the described reality. If, however, it 
is true that the cognitive process is at the same time a simplification process, (because it 
do not perceive the reality of things but its phenomenology), this does not mean it have to 
dismantle too the layer of complexity that surrounds the nature of things. 
This is the basis of analysis of Complexity Theory. Complex is each phenomenon not 
completely framed in a linear, deterministic and predictable context, which is different 
than from what was represented until now by the science that have blindly followed the 
principles of separation, reduction and abstraction. These principles, imposed by the 
Cartesian paradigm of simplification have created a separation between reality and its 
formal representation. The Complexity Theory aims to study the phenomena not more by 
simplifying, linearizing and dividing them, but observing the relevance of inter-
relationships among the components of systems - as well as their relationships with the 
environment and vice versa - in determining collective behaviors.  
In this sense economics is a complex system but also a co-evolutionary system. The 
economic co-evolution describes the evolution of two or more agents that interact closely 
with another one and with the environment, reciprocally affecting each other’s evolution. 
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Further because these agents are part of their environment, when they change, they 
change also their environment, and as it has changed they need to change again, and so it 
goes on as a continuous process. Each agent continually has to reorganize itself in order 
to seek a sufficient level of performance (fitness) to survive. In other words within this 
changing landscape, agents have to continually seek optimal positions and each strategic 
choice of a system leads to position changes of the others  in unpredictable and unplanned 
ways. But from this mass interaction regularities emerge and start to form a pattern which 
feeds back on the system and informs the interactions of the agents. 
From a mechanistic and linear vision, inspired by the Newtonian principles where the 
whole is always equal to the sum of its parts, they are now moving towards a complex 
approach where the whole is more than the sum of parts. The variables that measure the 
macroscopic state of a system, influenced by microscopic forces, can manifest linear or 
alternatively non linear dynamics, in this last case, coherent or purely chaotic dynamics. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 1 starts with a critique of traditional models of 
Fiscal Federalism highlighting the limits of the capacity to adequately capture the 
behavioral dynamics of economic systems. We stress the innovative aspects of 
complexity theory, and the premises on which to base the analysis of Fiscal 
decentralization in that perspective. To this end we focus the attention to the centrality 
that has concepts such as interaction between agents, non-linearity and co-evolution. In 
section 2 we briefly describe the fitness landscape and the NK model of Kauffman (1993) 
as tools used to analyze the evolutionary dynamics of complex systems and we stress the 
use of such tools in economics. Then we proceed to model a landscape in which 
jurisdictions, complex systems of small size, that must find the optimal path to organize 
the local tax planning and to optimize their local economy. Finally we compare the 
properties of Kauffman’s random exploration with a dynamic that reduces the 
randomness by introducing small constraints to be respected in the choice of fitness 
contributors. The work concludes with some considerations. 
2.The Economic Models of Fiscal Federalism and their limits 
The modeling that has dominated economic theory on Federalism until the 1980 
(Buchanan 1960; Musgrave 1959, Oates 1972, Tiebout 1956) shares a common approach: 
the simplification and abstraction of the assumptions of generally linear and static 
models, able to offer unique and deterministic solution. The Oates’model suggests, for 
example, the absence of "spillover effects" and economies of scale, constant production 
costs, but also uniformity of preferences within local government jurisdictions and the 
heterogeneity of preferences among local jurisdictions. Oates achieves, in fact, “not 
ambiguous results," just because he departs from these assumptions. Moreover the respect 
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of the “correspondence principle”1 is made difficult not only by the difficult 
determination of the territorial scale of a single good, but also by the fact that, generally, 
different public goods will have different optimum dimensional areas.  
The homogeneity of preferences also characterizes the model by Buchanan (1960), to 
which assumptions such as the existence of a revelation mechanism of preferences and a 
population with the same income are added. 
Starting from the heterogeneity of preferences within the jurisdiction Tiebout assumed 
that the individuals can move freely among the different jurisdictions offering different 
baskets of goods (government services) at a variety of prices (tax rates). Given that 
individuals have different personal valuations on these services and different ability to 
pay the attendant taxes, they will move from one local community to another until they 
find the best mix of services and taxes which maximizes their utility. With enough variety 
among the jurisdictional offerings, each community will end up with people having 
identical preferences. Through this choice process, an equilibrium provision of local 
public goods in accord with the tastes of individuals will be determined. While the model 
has the advantage of solving two major problems with government provision of public 
goods: preference revelation and preference aggregation, however it relies on a very 
restricted set of assumptions. Perfect mobility, perfect knowledge of the differences 
among the various local governments in terms of taxes to be paid and services to be used; 
large number of jurisdictions, limited relevance of spill-over effects, constant-cost of 
services production allow to obtain an efficient provision of public goods. 
It is clear that the traditional economic theory on Fiscal Federalism provides very general 
information from which is not always easy to draw practical guidance. 
Mainly, theoretical structure and, consequently, the application of those models depend 
heavily on the basic assumptions, which represent their cornerstone but at the same time 
their Achilles' heel.  
In fact these models are derived, in large part, by the translation in a simplified form of 
the insights of researchers on the reality, paying a hefty price due to the limits of this 
procedure, which is common to all sciences. It concerns the way in which the 
simplification is made and, above all, the level of simplification up to which we must or 
can be pushed without causing the loss of important and explicative information. 
Therefore it is not questioned whether the simplification must be made or not. The formal 
models that meet general approval are those which, although with some degree of 
abstraction, maintain a strong relationship with the represented phenomenon. More 
controversial, however, is the validity of those models that substantially deviate from 
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what they are trying to approximate, in spite of their apparent ability to synthesize better 
than less formalized models. 
There are many conditions in which opposite effects are algebraically added, neutralizing 
each other. Generally, to be able to catch them, it used an assumption that has the idea of 
an average that considerably summarizes the description. If, however, it disclaims to 
investigate the underlying interactions it loses much of the informational value of the 
result and it accepts the risk that, increasing the level of generality, the model will prove 
totally unfounded.  
To overcome these limits and the growing interest in the dynamics of evolutionary 
systems, researchers from different disciplines (physics, biology, economics) have started 
on the one hand to test the goodness of traditional theories and models, proved, in fact, 
often unable to adequately capture the behavioral dynamics of systems, and on the other 
hand to explain the new principles that would provide a justification for such inadequacy, 
forming the foundation for the construction of a new interdisciplinary approach: the 
Complexity Theory (Bertuglia and Vaio 2005, Colander et alt. 2004, Arthur et al. 1997). 
From a mechanistic and linear view of where the entire is always equal to the sum of the 
parts we are moving to a non-linear, complex view where "the entire is more than the sum 
of its parts". The linear view represents only one of many states in which a system can 
passes through: chaos and order coexist and the key to understanding all is the degree of 
interaction between the various elements that compose the system. 
What is interesting is the analysis of the behavior of "system-model" located in 
"environment-model" in order to understand how, through co-evolution the system adapts 
to the environment and vice versa from time to time resulting different configurations 
(Oliver-Roos 1999, Merry 1999, Stacey 1995, 2003). 
Systems and the environment have been studied often in the unique perspective, which 
had as its main, while not only, knowledge objective to determine the effects ex post 
generated from operating in the contexts of the subjects, without taking into consideration 
the "reciprocal" nature of the phenomena and, therefore, never resorting to the 
identification of a working scheme of their interaction in time and space by adopting i.e. a 
co-evolutionary approach. 
Speaking of co-evolution, then, implies the need to have a dual and contextual 
perspective of investigation, the perspective of systems and of the environment, in which 
the economic and also the anthropological variable are strongly represented and 
interdependent. 
It is a contextualized system in time and space the features of which are the fundamental 
variability of the environment (landscape) and the ability to use the environment as a 
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source of competitive advantage (survival skills, levels fitness2). Therefore the study of 
the characteristics of the system- environment relationship must take into account that, 
because of the interaction, any evolutionary change of a system can lead to evolutionary 
changes in another, and that, under the co-evolution, the improvements for a system will 
provide competitive advantages for another allowing finding much of the available 
resources. In this context, the fitness increase of a system is due to decreased fitness of 
another system. The only possible solution for a system involved in this competition, is to 
adapt continuously as fast as in order to maintain its fitness level compared to that of 
other economic systems and alternately change its configuration. 
Since the environment in which systems operate continuously changing as a result of co-
evolution between them and the environment, the purpose of each system is to optimize 
their level of fitness as an expression of the attitude and the ability to survive via typical 
adaptation mechanisms of natural selection3. 
This is important since the majority of economic activity involves the integration and 
coordination of interdependent resources. Some of these interdependencies are that an 
element of the system needs other element to perform its function, or at least it can 
perform well its function if the other element is also present. It is therefore helpful to 
think of an economic system (enterprise, firm, production system, a jurisdiction) as a 
network of connected elements by a dense and complex links of interdependencies. 
We can say the same to frame the Fiscal Decentralization in this framework of analysis. 
We consider the public sector as a big complex adaptive system in which different forces, 
hardly compatible, act with a multitude of human beings, with variables moods and 
continuous changes in political and economic scenarios. The fiscal decentralization as a 
prerequisite for organizing the entire fiscal structure led to the creation of local 
jurisdictions with fiscal autonomy. 
The jurisdictions are economic systems at many dimensions characterized by complexity 
at different hierarchical levels. In this sense they are complex systems characterized by 
the connections between different levels and sizes through communications network. 
Economic agents are the nodes of the network, which produce knowledge by processing 
the information. (Barabasi 2002). 
The jurisdictions play a very important role in the development of a country's 
competitiveness for economic development and that is why it stresses the need to develop 
an integrated and coordinated strategy that in a necessity bottom up logic, shifting the 
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emphasis from static to dynamic optimization, is based on the use and development of 
new research tools such as genetic algorithms, exploration models, and simulations to 
analyze the potential long-term consequences of fiscal choices, their adaptability and 
robustness through the change of scenery.  
3.Patching Theory and Jurisdictions 
A system moves around its fitness landscape through various mechanisms: the adaptive 
walk that estimates the effects of individual changes on the entire system and the 
patching, (according to Kauffman more efficient), which estimates the effects on sub-
system levels. 
Patching theory proposes to divide a complex adaptive system, and then the problems, in 
several not overlapping parts, the patches. The patches, however, are not independent of 
each other, or each agent of each patch pays attention only to what happens in its borders, 
losing sight of the unity of the system and of the problems to solve.  It is important to 
remember that the aim is always the efficiency and the survival of the global system, and 
then the originated sub-systems from its division constantly have to exchange information 
and co-evolve together. 
Therefore, the patching algorithm searches improvements in the local fitness, inside the 
patch, rather than global improvements. Instead of adopting changes in the state that have 
a positive impact on the entire system, it shall state changes that have positive impact on 
subsets of the system. 
This process seems to be particularly suitable to study social systems, those in which "[...] 
Today people work in separate groups by creating and not resolving conflicts of various 
kinds ... ... because the individual solutions do not converge towards a single compromise 
that can properly address all the needs of departure ". In particular, Kauffman (1993) 
argues that: "For systems with various types of local autonomy, the analogy with the 
patches can be a key mechanism for understanding the evolution of economic systems, 
cultural ....". 
It is, therefore, that the theory of fiscal federalism and the patching theory propose to 
analyze complex economic-financial issues of a complex economic system/ State in the 
same way by identifying jurisdictions with patches. 
Using the patching theory it also addresses the question of possibility, during the adaptive 
walk, to get into areas of fitness landscape with low efficiency and low fitness value. To 
avoid such mishaps it should leave the patches individually and freely evolve and auto-
organize themselves. 
Regarding fiscal federalism are the local jurisdictions that independently develop 
themselves and organize their own structure for the collection and spending of financial 
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resources as they see fit. All this, however, within the limits set by national legislation, 
which must coordinate the process of adaptation of individual geographical areas in order 
to reach the highest peak of the fitness landscape for  the entire State. In this situation the 
increase in efficiency can be spread with a proper management of externalities, trying to 
delete the negative ones and encourage positive ones. 
To allow a complex system to move in the landscape by dividing it into several pieces 
can clarify the problems within the system that, oversized, has  difficult to explore the 
entire territory, to design and to test new evolutionary paths. To divide the State in more 
local units of government cannot just give the entire tax system the needed degree of 
flexibility to adapt to the socio-economic changing, but also to find and to exploit all 
facets of the local microcosm. For happening this it is essential that the size of local 
jurisdictions is right. We saw earlier how Buchanan has resolved the matter. 
From an economic point of view it is important to take into account also the size of the 
externality effects, the preferences of citizens, administrative costs and economies of 
scale. These constraints are also added to those brought as dowry by patching: the patches 
should be neither too large, otherwise the complex system is likely to crystallize in a 
single configuration and hang in an area of the landscape, nor too small, if it doesn’t want 
that the pure chaos reigns supreme. 
These new restrictions are necessary to ensure to the financial structure of a country an 
appropriate process for future development, aimed at achieving the goals of economic 
theory of fiscal federalism. 
For example, to check what the right size is, we can use the fitness landscape in the 
following way. In the contemporary States the levels of government unlikely exceed the 
number of three: the central one, the middle (regions, Länder, cantons, ...) and local 
(municipalities, provinces Districts ...). Each level corresponds to a different dimension, 
taking into consideration economic and political considerations. On the intermediate, 
often in conflict with the central level, most often it is the focus of the system of 
territorial government. Consequently, the local units have very few skills. Considering 
these circumstances and leaving the central government, whose dimensions are not 
subject of the theory of fiscal federalism, we can construct two graphs of two landscapes. 
The first shows the fitness value of the various regions, the second of the municipalities. 
Each region and each municipality, in each case providing a degree of autonomy, takes its 
own internal organization, a configuration somewhat different from all others. So, on the 
graphs it observes the offered solutions by the intermediate and local levels of 
government for the problems to be solved with the Federal tax. In this way you can 
understand what the current level of efficiency, such as the possible future development 
and what is the process of adaptation at all levels. Obviously, the efficiency should be 
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measured on subjects in which all levels of Government have responsibilities, shared or 
not. Therefore the fitness landscape of regions and municipalities are compared taking 
into account, from time to time, the efficiency of the bureaucracy, the ability to contribute 
to local development, the efficiency of collection and spending of resources, etc.. In this 
way it can get guidance on what is a size that ensures a better solution of different issues 
and, therefore, at what level of government should entrust of responsibility of a certain 
field of public administration. 
The entire system must be flexible so as to monitor the behavior of all patches of all sizes 
and changes its organizational and space structure, by facilitating and encouraging the 
more efficient jurisdictions. It may also be that the optimal size is a cross between the 
regional and local level.  Patching and fitness landscape can also be used to find the best 
size for every possible configuration. As mentioned, each patch can organize its own 
management structures and obtain different results. Both between regions and between 
the municipalities will be preferred to the more efficient level which is on the highest 
peak of the landscape. 
This level, by taking into account the socio-economic differences, can be a model for all 
others which conform, to the final step of the adaptive walk. 
4.The use of the NK model in Economics 
Although there are several equivalent models to analyze the effects of interdependences 
on the complexity of a system, for the purposes of the paper we will deal with the 
theoretical core of fitness landscapes associated with Stuart Kauffman (1995) and the NK 
model where the fitness landscape is its basis. This model consists in the search of 
optimization for problems characterized by a large number of variables in conflict with 
each other. 
We consider a system composed of N elements that can have different states (0 and 1). 
These elements may have also different degrees of inter-dependence. Not to get into the 
details of these interdependencies, we’ll just treat them as if they were determined 
randomly. The only thing that we want to check in detail is the "degree of 
interdependence" in the system, i.e., the average number of other elements with which 
each element is interdependent. 
Denote by K the measure of interdependence whose values are between 0 and N-1. We 
define as system configuration each possible combination of states of individual 
components and as fitness the measure of the system performance. Each possible 
configuration of the elements of the system will have its own degree of fitness, more or 
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less dependent on the exploitation of complementarity4 and the greater or lesser effects of 
conflicts between systems. The set of fitness values associated with different 
configurations of the system draws a kind of "surface" of the fitness of the system called 
fitness landscape. 
NK model can be considered as composed of two distinct components: a specific problem 
and a searching algorithm in the space of possible solutions. As we have said, the 
problem is a set of possible solutions represented as binary strings, each associated with a 
value of fitness, which is the pay-off of that solution. The NK model analyzes the 
evolution of a single string, which represents the state (or configuration) of a system, and 
it is important, although preliminary, for the construction of more elaborate models, in 
order to suggest possible avenues for self-organization in situations characterized by co-
evolution. 
The relevance of the NK model in the study of economic organizations has been detected 
several times in the literature. These studies (Westhoff, Yarbrough e Yarbrough 1996, 
Pagano (998), Levinthal 1997), however, neglect the problem of co-evolution, which 
instead underpins this work. 
To clarify our intent, we consider a process of co-evolution between jurisdictions 
induced, for example, by the need to reorganize their economic system as a result of tax 
reform. The reorientation of the possibilities for tax planning and opportunities for 
economic growth, starting as a direct consequence, given the scarce resources, gives rise 
to a competition between jurisdictions. This is a phase of substantial uncertainty, caused 
by the fact that new opportunities are still ill-defined and can evolve rapidly. This 
situation gives rise to new dominant solutions in the tax planning of jurisdictions as a 
result of an extensive process of co-evolution influenced by interdependence. 
The choice to represent the co-evolution tends to emphasize that a change in the tax 
planning of a jurisdiction creates new and different opportunities or disadvantages for 
other jurisdictions. In other words, a movement of a jurisdiction along the fitness 
landscape can deform the fitness landscape of other jurisdictions. Here the fitness 
landscape of a jurisdiction is interpreted as the graph of a map that associates each 
possible variant of the state (configuration) of a jurisdiction with his fitness level, 
interpreted as a measure of its efficiency in a given environment and in a given time.  
If the effects of interdependence between jurisdictions are strong enough, the results of 
co-evolution in each jurisdiction are disturbed by the systematic deformation induced by 
simultaneous evolution of the fitness landscape in the other jurisdictions. 
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In this scenario, the constraints of interdependence plays a selective role because they 
affect the likelihood that the systems are well adjusted. This occurs because the 
interdependence constraints, by limiting the set of advantageous movements in the space 
of representation of the possible solutions, they increase the probability of evolution 
towards a stable configuration (despite the fact that the configuration may not be optimal 
ex post). In this way, the interdependence constraints help to reduce uncertainty and 
disorder in a system, considered as a set of evolving complex systems.  
Let us we assume that the possible levels of public spending of jurisdictions are 
uniformly distributed in space K, where K is obviously the measure of interdependence. 
To take a systematic relationship between interaction and contributions means that every 
fitness landscape is drawn from a distribution such that the degree of interaction of an 
element is correlated with its contribution fitness. A stronger interaction leads to stronger 
constraint of complementarity.  
On this premise, more integrated fitness landscape is even more rugged in the average. 
Then, as evidenced by Kauffman’s results in rugged landscape local optima are more 
numerous, although their average fitness value may be lower. In addition, routes to the 
local optima involve fewer steps. These properties can be used to prove that, at every 
stage of a co-evolutionary process evolving systems on a rugged landscape are more 
likely to be simultaneously on a peak of landscape, and then to move towards a local 
optimum.  
If the systems have a sufficiently large number of N elements, there is a trade-off between 
the probability that a process coevolves towards a stable local peak and the average 
fitness of a peak. So, it turns out that systems with an intermediate degree of interaction 
have a selective advantage against competitors, characterized by very high or low 
complementarity constraints. These properties are always true, no matter if evolution 
proceeds by random exploration of such trial and error (as assumed by Kauffman, 1993, 
1995), or by imposing constraints that help to identify optimal choices within a set local 
choices. Once the systems are simultaneously at peak fitness, co-evolution tends to 
decrease. 
In what follows, we try to show how the Kauffman’s model can be used to construct a 
formal model of the phenomena mentioned above. 
4.1A Landscape for Jurisdictions 
We define a level of public expenditure (t) in the jurisdiction i at time t. The information 
on the level of public spending are coded in a number of binary elements, each of which 
may have the value 0 or 1. We can think of the string as a way to encode a specific 
combination of supply of public goods and services. In each stage of research the number 
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of potentially available combinations tends to grow over time and the length of the string. 
To emphasize that the suggested approach has little to do with determining size of the 
problem, it is assumed that the length of all strings is finite and fixed. The efficiency of 
the chosen level of public spending, represented by the fitness value, defines the 
competitive strength of the jurisdiction.  
There are G jurisdictions in the country. The level of public spending in the jurisdiction i 
(i = 1, ..., G) is a string of N binary elements (xi1, xi2, ..., xiN), where each xij, j = 1, ..., N 
can take value 0 or 1. Then there are 2N possible levels of public spending for the 
Jurisdiction, corresponding to the number of different states in the space {0, 1}N that 
define the set Ai. We assume for simplicity that at the initial moment there is the same 
level of public spending in each jurisdiction. The configuration (planning) of the tax 
jurisdiction is defined by the level of public spending in i. Let xi and x'i N-strings in Ai. 
The distance between xi and x'i is defined by the number of different elements that arise.  
More formally: 
       (1) 
We therefore define two or more neighboring combinations that differ for a single 
element: d = 1. The neighborhood of xi is the set of strings in Ai with distance from xi ≤ 1 
and it is composed of xi and its N neighbors. The fitness function of the jurisdiction is the 
map ℜ→ii AF :  that associates each configuration of the jurisdiction i with its fitness 
value (real number). 
The fitness value of a string is the sum of fitness contributions of its N elements. More 
formally we define the map Fi as:  
     2 
where Fij (xi1, xi2, ..., xiN) is the fitness contribution of the string element xij, given its 
configuration (xij = 0 or 1). 
Fij is treated as a random real number in a unit interval. The above notation is used to 
formalize the concept of interdependence, since the fitness contribution of xij may depend 
not only on the configuration of this element, but also the configuration of the other 
elements of the string. 
1−≤ NKij  is the number of string elements that are interdependent with respect to xij, 
so 1+ijK  is the number of the non-redundant argument of Fij (xi1,xi2,...,xiN). For 
simplicity we assume that Kij is constant in all jurisdictions:  
Kij = K =, j = 1, ..., N   i= 1, ..., G      3 
In the absence of interdependence (K = 0), Fij (xi1, xi2, ..., xiN) can be written as: 
( ) ( )∑
=
−=
N
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ijijii xxxxd
1
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( ) ( )∑
=
=
N
j
iNiiijiNiii xxxFxxxF
1
2121 ,....,,....,
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The level of public expenditure with the highest fitness in Ai is then identified by the 
string such that the configuration of each element xij maximizes the fitness contribution 
Fij (xij) of that element. The fitness landscape of the Jurisdiction i is the graph of Fi on Ai. 
In a walk that combines xi to x'i is a sequence of strings such that xi and x'i are 
respectively the first and last element of the sequence, and the distance between each pair 
of adjacent elements of the sequence is d = 1. 
A walk that joining xi to x'i and is minimal if the distance to x'i is strictly decreasing on 
this "walk". 
x'i is a local maximum of Fi (xi1, xi2, ..., xiN) on Ai if and only if on every walk that 
joining x'i to a string yi such that Fi (yi)> Fi (x'i) there is a y'i such that Fi (y'i) <Fi (x'i) e 
d (x'i, y'i) <d (x'i, yi)5.  
Suppose that K = 0. If xi is a global maximum of Fi on Ai, and yi is an arbitrary string in 
this set, then Fi does not diminish in any shortest walk joining xi to yi. 
The proposition is self-evident. Because the walk is minimal, there must be many steps 
along the path as there are elements of yi, which differ in their configuration, from the 
corresponding element of xi. At every step along the path, the distance from xi decreases, 
since there is another element of yi that has the same value of the corresponding element 
of xi. This value maximizes the fitness contribution of the element because xi is a global 
maximum, without reducing the fitness contribution of the other elements (Because K = 
0)6. If K = 0, the fitness landscape of the jurisdiction i has at most one local optimum of 
Fi on Ai which corresponds to global optimum7. 
We suppose K > 0. The choice of configuration to maximize the fitness contribution of 
the element xij, given the configuration of the other N-1 elements of the string, cannot 
positively contribute to the general fitness level of public spending of jurisdiction i. The 
reason is that interdependence implies the possibility of a feed-back of uncertain sign 
stemming from the new configuration of the xij to the fitness contribution of the other 
elements. This is equivalent to the possibility that there may be more local optima. The 
situation is illustrated in Figure 1 with reference to the simple case N = 2 and K = 1. 
                                                     
5 With reference to the case K=0, it is important to remember how a change from 0 to 1, or vice versa, in 
the configuration of a single string element, does not affect the fitness contribution of the other components 
6 The probability that a randomly chosen string in a landscape K=0 is a local peak is 1/2N. Let F*(N,K) be 
the expected fitness of a local peak. F*(N,0) is independent of N and can be expressed as 
( ) 666.0,
1
=





∑
=
N
j
jj baMaxE
 
where (aj,bj) are N couples of real random numbers uniformly distributed on the unit interval. 
7 This is easily demonstrable by supposing the contrary. If xi is a maximum of Fi on Ai There may be in 
the same space an isolated maximum (local or global), yi ≠ xi of the fitness function Fi. By construction Fi has 
a non-monotonic behavior on every minimal path joining yi and xi. 
( )∑
=
N
j
ijij xF
1
14 
 
Fig.1 
In this example, the set Ai of the possible levels of public spending in the jurisdiction is 
composed of 4 strings. Strings (0.0) and (1.1) are the local optima. The path that joints the 
strings is done on the sides of a square but not on its diagonal because the diagonal steps 
involve simultaneous changes of many elements, not just one. By construction we know 
that in each path joining (0.0) to (1.1) the fitness function does not have a monotonic 
behavior. 
Finally, we consider the greatest interdependence (K=N-1). The fitness landscape is 
random in the sense that the fitness values of the neighbors are totally uncorrelated. A 
change (from 0 to 1), or vice versa in the configuration of a single element, say element j 
of the level of public spending of the jurisdiction, not only assigns a new random fitness 
contribution to Fij, but also a new random contribution Fhi to each component of h (h = 1, 
..., N8 . The reason is that now xji is not a redundant argument of Fhi (h = 1, N)9 . The 
statements are based on the following assumptions. 
Since K = N-1 the fitness values are not correlated; each string in a landscape has a 
probability 1/(N +1) to be a local optimum and the expected value of local optima is 
2N/(N+1).  
In each landscape the lower local optimum has a higher fitness value than the fitness 
value of the other N strings. The fitness value of the local optimum can be understood as 
the maximum in a set of 2N fitness values10.  
                                                     
8 Footnote 9 implies that F*(1,0)=0.666. If N>1 F*(N,N-1) first grows above 0.666 and then decreases 
monotocally to 0.5. Moreover if K=N-1 then F*(mN,K)=F*(N,K) for any m ≥ 1. This suggests that F*(N,K) 
remains approximately constant as N grows to infinity , while K is fixed at N-1. 
9  The fitness value of each element on a landscape K = N - 1 is a random number, uniformly distributed 
between 0,1. The probability that a randomly chosen element of the landscape is a local peak (its fitness value 
is higher than its N neighbours) is 1/(N +1). Then there are on average  2N/(N + 1) local peak on a landscape 
K = N-1. 
10 This involves lower and upper bounds to F*(N,N-1):  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]mm MaxENNFMaxE βββααα ,....,,1,*,....,, 2121 <−<  
Where each αm e βm i san average of  N random numbers in the unit interval m=N+1, M=2N. Since the 
expected fitness value of intermediate local optima uniformly distributed between the lower and upper 
bounds above, we have: 
Order statistic shows that 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } 7.02/,....,,,....,, 2121 ≈+ Mm MaxEMaxE βββααα  for 104 ≤≤ N .  
Consequently F*(N,N-1) decreases as N increases and converges to 0.5 as N grows to infinity  because 
each single sample average αm and βm must behave accordingly. Moreover, we consider K=N-1 and F*(N,K) 
where N=mN and K=K. Through a possible re-ordering of elements, every string of length N can be thought 
of as being composed of m segments of N elements each. Within each segment each element is connected to 
the K other elements. Thus, the fitness contribution of each component depends on its configuration (0 or 1) 
and on the configuration of every other component of the same segment. Hence the expected fitness value of 
(0,1) 
 
 
 
 
 
(1,1) 
(0,0) (1,0) 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } 2/,....,,,....,,1,* 2121 Mm bbbMaxEaaaMaxENNF +=−
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On average, the higher K implies that: the higher is the number of local optima, the 
shorter is the minimal path that connects a random string in Ai to the nearest local 
optimum; the lower the correlation between fitness values Fi of neighboring strings xi, yi. 
4.2Fully vs. constrained randomness in a landscape exploration. 
So far we have given a formal description of what could be a fitness landscape of a 
jurisdiction. Let’s see how the jurisdiction can precede this exploration. Here we compare 
the properties of Kauffman’s random exploration with a dynamic that reduces the 
randomness by introducing small constraints to be respected in the choice of fitness 
contributions. The choice rises by the assumption that the introduction in a totally random 
model, of some qualitatively and quantitatively important information, without falling 
into over-simplistic, increases the effectiveness of the use of complex tools. At each time 
t, the jurisdiction i doesn’t have a perfect knowledge of Ai, because the perception of a 
potentially profitable combination of elements xi ϵ Ai, and even more, the information on 
its fitness F(xi), is available only if xi is in the neighborhood of the string that defines the 
tax configuration of jurisdiction i at time t. The information, even when it can be codified, 
does not immediately translate into knowledge that can be exploited for useful purposes. 
The transformation of information into knowledge requires understanding, learning and 
adaptation. 
We can assume that this not encode information can be gained through experience. 
Unlike sectors where every change is always associated with a random mechanism, here 
we try to know how the research can proceed through the combination of random 
explorations and more targeted explorations aimed to achieve pre-selected goals. 
According to the dynamic of NK model induced by random exploration on a fitness 
landscape the neighbor element x'i of the current state xi is randomly selected at any 
time11. The fitness value F(x'i) was then examined, and a movement toward x'i occurs if 
F(x'i)>F(xi). 
A greater focus on the intentional components of research generates the assumption that 
at any moment a system moves one step from pre-determined state to the state identified 
by the string with the highest fitness value in the given neighborhood.  
This modeling strategy produces a slightly different dynamic on Ai. This comes out when 
the sequence of a neighbor xi of x'i uses combinations of intentional and random choices: 
in each time n<N components of xi with relatively low contributions to fitness are 
intentionally selected, one of which is randomly selected and its configuration modified. 
                                                                                                                                                 
each segment is an average of N random numbers in the unit interval and is identical to the expected fitness 
contribution of every other segments. This holds independently of the size of m. 
11 This amounts to a random selection of one element of xi and a change of its configuration (from 0 to 1 
or vice versa). 
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As before, a move towards x'i occurs if F(x'i)>F(xi). The figure shows the dynamics of a 
single jurisdiction on the fitness landscape N=2 and K=1 described in Fig. 1. Black points 
identify the local peaks of the fitness landscape. The string (1.1) is the global optimum Fi 
on Ai. The string (0.0) is a degenerate basin of attraction, which coincides with the string 
itself. 
 
Fig.2 
Fig.2 clarifies how the landscape in this example is completely robust in the sense that 
each neighbor of a string that is not a local optimum is a local isolated peak. 
It may be instructive to compare the asymptotic average properties of NK model of 
Kauffman’s random exploration and the dynamics of the model with bounded 
randomness on fitness landscape randomly generated for extreme cases of absence and 
complete interdependence. The main differences are: when K=0, the full randomly 
exploration and the bounded randomness exploration at the end reach both the global 
optimum of the landscape, the number of steps required is smaller in the bounded 
randomness, because every step is taken towards the pre-selected direction12. 
0 <K <N - 1 the dynamics of randomly exploration converges to the average of global 
optimum of the landscape. The average fitness value F*(N, K) of a local optimum 
changes with N and K. 
For finite values N, the asymptotic deterministic dynamic on a landscape 0<K<N-1 
climbs a local optimum of fitness, which is surely above average. If K=N - 1, the fitness 
of highest optimum at average drops to 0.5 when N tend to infinity. The same is not true 
if N grows to infinity, but K remains constant. 
4.3.The Effect of Co-evolution of Interdependence. 
We consider pairs of levels of public spending in G jurisdictions of the state. We also 
consider the hypothesis that a single level is evolving in each jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
efficiency of public spending here refers to the level of public spending of jurisdiction i (i 
= 1, ..., G). On any given landscape, the dynamics are assumed to be with reduced 
randomness, but, in line with the conclusions of the preceding paragraph, the same 
qualitative results are obtained when exploratory dynamics are considered totally random. 
                                                     
12 The average fitness value F*(N,0) of a global optimum is 0,666. 
 
(0,1) 
 
 
 
 
 
(1,1) 
(0,0) (1,0) 
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The opportunity to optimize its tax system that is based on the interdependence between 
the elements, we remember, imply that, in general, the fitness of the 2N states of i, 
depends on the current state of the other G-1 jurisdictions. Following Kauffman (1993), 
we can predict these effects such as deformities of the fitness landscape of the jurisdiction 
i, triggered by changes in the other G-1 jurisdictions. More precisely, we consider the 
changes in fitness levels of public spending in the jurisdiction i (i = 1, ..., G). The 
changes in the landscape can be global or local. If the relationships of interdependence 
between jurisdictions are limited to small segments of the string, the change of a single 
element does not induce a change in the global fitness landscape of another jurisdiction. 
However, because the State is composed of many jurisdictions, a multiplicity of 
individual change takes place simultaneously. Hence G is larger than N, the greater the 
probability of a global change of the landscape. If G is very small relative to N, the case 
of deformation bases on the assumption that global interdependence across jurisdictions is 
pervasive. Situations of complete interdependence are defined by the fact that each 
component of each string is connected to every other component of every other string. A 
single change in a state of an element is therefore sufficient to set up an entirely new 
landscape for any other jurisdiction. We use this rather extreme hypothesis, because it 
suggests an approach that strongly takes into account the co-evolution, whence the 
general qualitative effects of complementarity are more easily detected. So we define C 
the number of co-evolving systems. 
The economic dynamics of G jurisdictions are determined by their interdependences, and 
the following tables describe the list of fitness values of each element corresponding to 
each state of level of public spending in the remaining jurisdictions. 
The first element of the list is the one with the highest fitness value. The possibility that 
adjacent elements in the list have the same fitness value is excluded, because the event 
could be an irrelevant fluke.  
Two examples are shown below for the case: N=2, C=2. The two jurisdictions are called 
α and β, and, by way of example, α00 is the state of public expenditure (0,0) of 
jurisdiction α. Table 1 refers to the case K = 0, Table 2 to case K = 1. 
 
Se β00 : α10 α11 α01 α00 
Se β01 : α11 α10 α01 α00 
Se β10 : α01 α00 α11 α10 
Se β11 : α00 α10 α01 α11 
 
Se α00 : β11 β10 β01 β00 
Se α01 : β10 β00 β01 β11 
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Se α10 : β00 β10 β11 β01 
Se α11 : β01 β11 β00 β10 
Table 1 
 
Se α00 : β00 β11 β01 β10 
Se α01 : β00 β11 β10 β01 
Se α10 : β11 β00 β10 β01 
Se α11 : β11 β00 β01 β10 
 
Se β00 : α00 α11 α01 α10 
Se β01 : α00 α11 α01 α10 
Se β10 : α11 α00 α10 α01 
Se β11 : α11 α00 α01 α10 
Table 2 
The time is discrete, and at each t time each configuration moves from the present state to 
fittest neighbor through simultaneous changes. The representation space of the dynamics 
induced by a given interdependence pattern between G jurisdictions, given the co-
evolution, is the hypercube {0.1} NG. Each hyper-row, or hyper-column of this 
representation space consists of an ordered series of 2N elements, where each element, or 
a point (x1, ..., xG) is an ordered list of tax configurations13 one for each jurisdiction.  
The neighbor of a point in state space is an ordered list (y1, ..., yg) such that each yi is a 
string of N binary codes N and d(xi, yi) <1.  
A point in the state space has NG neighbors. Each element of a hyper-row (or hyper-
column) is therefore a configuration of a jurisdiction, and moves on the same hyper-line 
(or hyper-column) on which we meet all the possible states of the jurisdiction i, while the 
state of other G-1 jurisdiction is unchanged. 
Recall that for K=0 each fitness landscape has one peak and that, by construction, each 
hyper-row (or hyper-column) refers to the fitness landscape of a given jurisdiction. 
Suppose that the level of interdependence is given.  
A rest point in the state space corresponding to this model is that all jurisdictions are 
simultaneously on a peak of fitness. If and only if K=0, on every hyper-row (or hyper-
column) in the state space there is at most one rest point in which the co-evolution slows 
down as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows, in fact, associated dynamics in the 
representation space of possible solutions {0,1} 4 determined by the model of 
interdependence indicated in Table 2. 
                                                     
13 Strings of N binary codes 
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Fig. 3 
When K>0, when the co-evolution begins to decrease, not all jurisdictions are necessarily 
on a global optimum of their landscape (see, for example, the state (α11, β00) of Fig 3. 
Some may be at the global peak while some others at a strictly local peak, or they may be 
simultaneously at a strictly local peak. 
The number of admissible patterns of interdependence depends on the parameters N and 
K and the co-evolution. Since there are 2N different states of a given jurisdiction, there are 
2N! re-ordering of these different strings based on their fitness value. 
When K=N-1, each of these re-ordering is admissible. However, if K=0, two adjacent 
strings differ on every admissible re-ordering in one and only one element. 
Since every configuration to the jurisdiction i (i = 1, ..., G) can be coupled with 2N(G-1) 
different states of the remaining jurisdictions, we obtain [(2N!)2N (G-1)]S possible patterns 
of interdependence for the case K = N - 1, where the parameter S identifies the degree of 
co-evolution, and a considerably lower number of possibilities for K=0.  
Any admissible model gives rise to an evolutionary dynamics in phase space, which is a 
set of 2NS trajectories, each starting from a different initial condition in phase space (see 
Fig 3 and 4). 
 
Fig. 4 
5. Conclusions  
This paper comes from the idea to investigate how the new tools provided by the 
Complexity Theory may offer interpretative solutions to the optimization of an 
evolutionary economic complex system  
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Complexity Theory is presented, in fact, as an opportunity to better understand reality not 
to neglect a priori all the phenomena that cannot be pigeonholed and explained according 
to preconceived thesis. 
Because complex, the economy is a system that "evolves". Normally we're used to 
thinking about evolution in a biological context, but the modern evolutionary theory, as 
branch of Complexity Theory, sees evolution as something much more general. Evolution 
is an algorithm, is a formula that, through its special brand of trial and error, creating new 
projects and solve difficult problems. The evolution concerns not only the DNA 
"substrate", but each system has a feature to process and collect information. In short, the 
simple recipe of the evolution of "to differentiate, select and amplify" creates news, 
knowledge and growth. An economic system, then, is how an ecological niche, with 
different "species" of players, agents, engaged in a struggle aimed at the "survival of the 
fittest". Paul Krugman calls this metaphorical comparison of the economic and biological 
systems "biobabble". 
Efforts to understand modern economics as an evolutionary system avoid such 
metaphors, and instead, focus on understanding how the universal algorithm of evolution 
is literally and specifically implemented in the substrate of information processing of 
human economic activities. 
Having shown that as fiscal federalism is to be understood as a dense network of 
economic-financial relationships between different coevolving complex and adaptive 
systems (the central and local government), linked by strong interdependencies clarifies 
even more the goal of the paper aimed to study fiscal federalism from a dynamic and 
evolutionary point of view, seeking solutions to problems posed by traditional economic 
theory with new analysis tools of Complexity.  
The solution of a problem built on an adaptive complex system, cannot be searched as if 
we were solving a simple problem without interconnections. To identify in fact, a single 
optimal solution while it is possible for a simple system, it is not for a complex system. 
In this case it is only possible on the basis of its numerous connections, to determine the 
process by which different solutions may emerge, more or less favorable to the resolution 
of the problem. Taking into account the existence of multiple solutions, the same research 
can be done through a searching algorithm on a fitness landscape, a dynamic landscape in 
which complex adaptive systems are moving in search of optimum conditions. The 
configuration of this landscape is strongly conditioned by the presence of co-evolution 
and interdependencies. Also the jurisdictions as result of fiscal decentralization can be 
regarded as evolving complex systems, although smaller. From these assumptions and on 
the basis of evolutionary dynamics, we analyzed the behavior of jurisdictions to develop a 
model to identify their optimal fiscal configurations by using NK-model. 
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The NK-model can be considered as composed of two distinct components: a specific 
problem and a searching algorithm in the space of possible solutions. As we have said, 
the problem is a set of possible solutions represented as binary strings, each associated 
with a fitness value, which is in fact the pay-off of that solution. The searching algorithm 
consists of repeated mechanism in order to scan the solution space from a (usually 
randomly chosen) initial string, or a binary N-dimensional space. The ongoing research is 
defined in terms of rules on how to move from one point to another. For example, the 
typical search, originally proposed (Kauffman, 1993) is to choose randomly a string in 
which changing one bit, in the case that the changed string has fitness higher than the 
current one, the new string is accepted, and otherwise it is rejected. 
The repeated application of the algorithm generates a pattern in the space of possible 
solutions. The pattern ends when the rule reaches a string from which all possible strings 
within the space of solutions were rejected. Two aspects make particularly attractive the 
NK-model. First, you can determine the whole must be the solution space, or the fitness 
landscape. Building a landscape with few or no interactions (represented by the value of 
K) means to generate the equivalent of simple problems, increasing K generates a 
complex problem.  
The second aspect is the representation of the NK-model searching algorithm. The NK-
model assumes a local search. Local, because the research involves the inability to 
observe the space beyond the near immediate focusing on the goal of improving their 
present condition. The two aspects, complexity through interaction and local search, 
paradoxically leads to a simplified and then manageable of many real situations.  
It’s an interesting tool because it provides the opportunity for the researcher to represent 
and control the two aspects of problem solving: the complexity of the problem and the 
degree of expertise for finding a solution. It’ s possible to use NK model to generate and 
to evaluate the space formed by the two dimensions of the complexity of the problems 
and skills in the resolution strategy in order to represent both aspects of a real-world in 
small-scale. The use of the NK-model arises from the possibility of establishing a sort of 
relationship between the skills of decision makers and the related difficulty of 
intervention in economic policy. In this case, it is no more relevant that the modeled 
problem is much simpler than the real one, since even the solution strategies are modeled 
in a much less sophisticated way. By controlling both aspects we can be expected that the 
properties of the set that includes the solutions generated in the model are similar to the 
set of real solutions generated in real systems with an equivalent ratio of task and skills 
difficulty in finding a solution.  
Starting with Kauffman’s work, and introducing some constraints to the full causality, it 
was built a model whose theoretical results show that a change in the tax planning of a 
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jurisdiction produce new and different opportunities or disadvantages for other 
jurisdictions. In other words, the results show that a movement of a jurisdiction along the 
fitness landscape can deform the fitness landscape of other jurisdictions. If the effects of 
interdependence between jurisdictions are strong enough, the results of co-evolution in 
each jurisdiction are disturbed by the systematic deformation-induced by simultaneous 
evolution of the fitness landscape in other jurisdictions. 
In this scenario, interdependence constraints have played a selective role influencing the 
adaptability of systems. In this way, the interdependence constraints have contributed to 
reduce the uncertainty and disorder in a system, considered as a set of evolving complex 
systems. 
Moreover, according to Kauffman’ result, the model shows the complex nature of each 
system, justified by its ability to associate order and disorder. The disorder is represented 
by the random choice of fitness contributions fitness, order, however, by a coherent 
structure, produced by the model and made of configurations, adaptive walk, fitness 
landscape and fitness value. 
To take a systematic relationship between interaction and fitness contributions means that 
each fitness landscape is drawn from a distribution such that the degree of interaction of 
an element is correlated with its fitness contribution. A stronger interaction leads to 
stronger constraints of complementarity. On this premise, the more closely integrated 
fitness landscape is even more rugged in the average. Moreover, as evidenced by the 
results of Kauffman, in a landscape more rugged local optima are more numerous, 
although their average fitness value may be lower. In addition, walks to the local optima 
involve fewer steps. These properties were used to demonstrate that, at every stage of a 
co-evolutionary process, the systems evolving on a rugged landscape are more likely to 
be simultaneously on a peak of fitness, and then to move towards a local optimum. If the 
systems have a sufficiently large number of N elements, there is a trade-off between the 
probability that a process co-evolve towards a stable local peak and the average fitness 
value of a peak. Thus, it confirms that systems with an intermediate degree of interaction 
have a selective advantage against competitors, characterized by very high or very low 
complementarity constraints. 
These properties are always true, no matter if evolution proceeds by random exploration 
of such trial and error (as most assumed by Kauffman), or by choosing to impose 
constraints, as in the proposed model, to help identify optimal choices within a set of 
local choices. Once the systems are simultaneously on a peak of fitness, co-evolution 
tends to decrease. 
Finally it stressed that the decision to introduce constraints to randomness rises from on 
the assumption that the introduction, in a totally random model, of some qualitatively and 
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quantitatively important information, without falling into over-simplifications, increases 
the effectiveness of using of complexity tools. 
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